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ABSTRACT 
Transportation modes produce many external costs such as congestion, accidents, and 
environmental impacts (pollution, noise and so on). From the microeconomic theory it is well 
known that in order to maximize social welfare, transportation modes should internalize the 
marginal costs they produce. Allocative efficiency is achieved when all transportation modes 
are priced at their social marginal cost.  
 
The objective of this research is to evaluate to what extent different passenger transport 
modes internalize their social marginal costs. This analysis is important since it affects the 
competitiveness of the different transport modes for a given OD pair. The case study analyzed 
is the corridor Madrid-Barcelona in Spain and the different transport modes have been 
considered (cars, buses, high-speed train and air).  
The research calculates the marginal social cost per user for each transportation mode, and it 
compares it with the average fare—allowing for the effect of discriminatory taxes—currently 
paid by the users. The external costs are calculated according to the guidelines established by 
the European Union. The gap between the marginal social cost and the price paid by users 
will provide the extra cost per passenger that each transport mode should have to pay for 
internalizing the external cost it produces. 
The research shows that external costs already produced by road and air transport modes are 
much higher than those produced by rail. However, the results show that road transport 
already internalizes every external costs it produces because users pay high fuel taxes. In 
other words, although rail transportation produces lower external costs, road transportation 
pays more than it should on the basis of the social marginal costs. 
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The results of this work might be of help for European policy actions to be undertaken in the 
future. 
 
Keywords: transport externalities, transport modes, fairness competition, High Speed Rail, 
Madrid-Barcelona corridor 
 
1. Introduction 
The present study aims to evaluate the transport costs of one of the most important European 
corridors: the Madrid-Barcelona corridor. Through a Benefit-Cost Analysis it will be possible 
to assess to what extent different transport modes internalize their external costs and the price 
that the marginal user would pay in terms of taxes and fees. 
The issue involves the policies adopted by the European Union(EU) in the transport sector. 
The current situation of transport costs is inevitably the result of European legislation and the 
one of individual Member States. For this reason it is interesting to understand what the 
address of the policies implemented to date was and what effects they have generated. It 
should also assess whether the policies have been oriented in the direction of social welfare 
maximization. Within this framework the problem of the evaluation of externalities is 
analyzed. In fact, over the years there have been many studies and methodologies for the 
calculation of the external costs of transport modes. If we consider them as a whole, as done 
by Quinet (2004), we see that the results are highly variable and not able to allow a uniform 
evaluation. This is the reason that fostered the European Union (EU) to turn the University of 
Delft in order to develop a methodology valid for all the Member Countries. 
After a general overview of the problem, we explored the theme through the case study of the 
Madrid-Barcelona corridor. In this paper, we focus our attention on passenger across all 
modes of transport available: High Speed Rail (HSR), Air, Car and Bus. 
The internalization of external costs is a necessity if the objective is to maximize the social 
welfare in terms of economy and ensure a fair competition among different transport modes. 
The costs incurred by different modes of transport are influenced by the regulations in the 
country under study. For this reason, this work starts from an analysis of the legislation in 
force in Europe, from its evolution in the field of transport and the way in which Spain has 
transposed and implemented these regulations. 
The first step was to calculate the externalities in terms of pollutant emissions, noise, 
accidents and congestion of the different transport modes. The analysis was completed by 
evaluating the direct and indirect taxation that Spain plans for transport and any subsidies that 
the state gives to ensure the public service. All data collected and used refer to the year 2009. 
The last step was to achieve an economic balance between internal and external costs, that 
each transport mode must support, and all the financial voices that the society should consider 
to do the shipping service. This allowed us to assess how, and to what extent, the various 
transport modes internalize their costs. It is important to underline that all of these 
assessments have been made in reference to the marginal user, in order to evaluate the 
contribution of the individual traveler. 
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The methodology of this research is based on a similar research study conducted previously 
by the transport research center TRANSyT of the Technical University of Madrid (Vassallo, 
Solís García; Pérez-Martínez and Pérez de Villar, 2005). They developed an economic 
balance of external costs vs. users’ fees for different freight transport modes in Spain. 
The objective of this paper is to determine, taking into account the case study of the Madrid-
Barcelona corridor, to what extent passenger transport modes internalize the external costs 
they produce. This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 a description of the state-of-the 
art on the internalization of external costs is reported. In section 3 we describe the 
methodology adopted. In section 4 the case study of the Madrid-Barcelona corridor is 
presented. In section 5 conclusions and further perspectives are highlighted. 
 
2. Internalization of external costs for transport modes in Europe 
Microeconomic theories state that the internalization of the external costs produced by 
different transport modes is a need to maximise social welfare (Pigou, 1920). The European 
Union has progressively moved towards this approach, particularly regarding heavy goods 
vehicles.  
 
Since 1971 the European Union has been trying to establish a policy on pricing infrastructure 
use. However, the strong opposition from some member states and road haulers to this policy 
stopped its progress for a long time (Vassallo, 2001). In 1998, the European Commission 
came back with the publication of the White Paper entitled “Fair payment for infrastructure 
use: A phased approach to a common transport infrastructure charging framework strategy in 
the European Union” (European Commission, 1998). This paper recommended that the 
member states should carry out a progressive harmonization of fee-charging principles for all 
the commercial transport modes by proposing an approach based on the “user-pay” principle. 
Even though many of the objectives of the White Paper were not fully met due to the 
opposition of the member states, its publication brought some changes in the legislation. The 
Directive 1999/62 on “The Charging of Heavy Goods Vehicles for the Use of Certain 
Infrastructures (known as “Eurovignette” Directive)” passed a short time later. However, this 
Directive did not represent a great advance. Its main contribution was the implementation of a 
minimum tax rate on the ownership of those vehicles that had an authorized maximum gross 
laden weight of over 12 tones. This Directive also established that trucks should not be 
subject to fees in addition to whatever tolls they had to pay on toll-roads. 
The White Paper “European transport policy for 2010: time to decide” published in 2001 
(European Commission, 2001) represented an important milestone in the European transport 
policy, since it linked for the first time sustainability to transport pricing approaches. Until the 
publication of this paper, pricing policies were mostly based on covering the infrastructure 
cost (Timothy, 1992). Its main objective was to put a new focus on sustainable transport and 
global strategy by gradually decoupling economic from transport growth (Pahaut and Sikow, 
2006). Regarding road fee-charging, the White Paper reinforced the principle of paying for 
infrastructure use as a way of internalizing external transport costs, and announced the 
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Commission’s intention of proposing a Directive on charging fees for the use of road 
infrastructure. From 2001 onwards, the European Union has shown a much greater interest in 
facing the internalization of the external costs produced by transport. With this objective, the 
first question of the EU has been that of calculating the external costs of different transport 
modes. During the last few years, several studies and methodologies have been proposed for 
computing such costs. However, Quinet (2004) shows that the results from different studies 
are substantially different. Consequently, no consensus seems to exist among the scientific 
community regarding the quantification of such cost. 
In order to have a set of guidelines to quantify the external costs of transport, the European 
Union asked the University of Delft to develop a computation methodology that might be 
applied to all the member states (Maibach et al., 2008). These guidelines focussed its attention 
on freight transport since the European Commission was not concerned about pricing 
interurban passengers transport modes.  
The mid-term review of the White Paper conducted in 2006 (European Commission, 2006) 
paid special attention to the possibility of modifying upward fee-charges in environmentally 
sensitive locations and urban areas. 
The next legislative advance in infrastructure fee-charging policy in the European Union was 
the approval of the Directive 2006/38/EC amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of 
heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructure. The Directive established that such 
fee-charges were to be applied in all the EU countries to commercial vehicles over 3.5 tonnes 
in the Trans European Transport Network and roads to which traffic could be diverted by 
2012. However, the member states could exempt trucks below 12 tons from such payment if 
such fees create significant adverse effects or transaction costs were higher than 30% of the 
revenues produced. Member states were free to impose fees for the use of the roads other than 
the trans-European Networks. Charges could be implemented depending on distance, location 
of the road, damage to the pavement, EURO classification of the vehicle, time of the day, and 
congestion on the road. Revenues from HGV charges should be used for the maintenance of 
the infrastructure concerned and for the transport sector as a whole, in order to promote 
sustainable development of transport networks. The Directive sat up the principles to charge 
fees to HGVs, but it did not establish the specific minimum charge to be applied. In this 
respect the Directive entrusted the European Commission with the mandate to present, no 
later than June 2008, a “generally applicable, transparent and comprehensible model” for the 
assessment of all external costs, a model which is intended to serve as the basis for future 
calculations of infrastructure charges. Owing to this, the Commission entrusted to a group of 
universities and research institutes the task of producing a guide to assess external 
transportation costs. At the time of writing this paper, a draft of this guide had already been 
completed but the final version of the document was not yet available. Regarding 
discriminatory fuel taxes, the Directive says that any future decision on setting up charges 
should take full account of the tax burden already borne by road haulage companies, 
including vehicle taxes and fuel excise duties. 
The White Paper “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system” (European Commission, 2011) defines the Mobility 
as vital for the internal market and for the quality of life of citizens as they enjoy their 
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freedom to travel. In this sense, one of the most important goals is moving towards full 
application of “user pays” and “polluter pays” principles and private sector engagement to 
eliminate distortions, including harmful subsidies, generate revenues and ensure financing for 
future transport investments. It is also very important to note that the Commission has a long-
term goal of charging for the use of the road to all vehicles and across the network, reflecting 
the minimum cost of maintenance of infrastructure, congestion, air pollution and noise 
pollution. Besides, the internalisation of externalities, the elimination of tax distortions and 
unjustified subsidies and free and undistorted competition are therefore part of the effort to 
align market choices with sustainability needs. 
Finally, the latest legislative advance is the approval of the Directive 2011/76/EC amending 
Directive 1999/62/EC, and it includes some news with respect to the previous one. Firstly, a 
new charge, called “external – cost charge” is included. The purpose of this charge is to 
recover the cost incurred due to traffic-based air pollution and/or traffic-based noise pollution.  
So the new final charge is divided into two charges: external – cost charge and the previous 
infrastructure charge. Secondly, the member states must vary the infrastructure charge 
depending on the EURO classification of the vehicle, whereas in the earlier Directive 
2006/38/EC they could vary this infrastructure charge. The latest addition introduced is 
concerning the revenues from the HGV charges. It is recommended that the revenues are used 
for the maintenance of the infrastructure concerned and for the transport sector as a whole, 
while before it was obligatory.   
 Several aspects of the Directive draw our attention to the implementation of the infrastructure 
fee-charging policy in the European Union. First, while the initial steps towards the 
implementation of this policy considered all transportation modes, including private cars and 
coaches for the road, Directive 2011/76/EC talks only about Heavy Goods Vehicles, leaving 
aside other transport modes such as rail, air, and maritime transportation, as well as other 
vehicles such as cars and coaches. This omission seems to work against allocative efficiency 
and modal fairness. Second, the Directive does not say anything about the application of 
subsidies to other transport modes, as happens with railroads in many European Countries. 
3. Methodology to assess the internalization of external costs 
The methodology traditionally used to assess whether the external costs produced by a 
transport mode are internalized or not consists of comparing the external marginal cost 
produced with the infrastructure charges paid by each transport vehicle (car, bus, train, plane 
and so on). This approach assumes that each transport mode covers all their internal costs or 
in other words, that the transport mode is not subsidized. If a transport mode was subsidized, 
subsidies would have to be subtracted from the charge side of the economic balance. 
However, in this paper we are going to use a different approach (Fig. 1). Instead of paying our 
attention on the vehicle (train, car, plane and so on), we are going to focus on the user. To 
each user a certain transport cost can be assigned, derived from her/his trip. For public 
transport modes, such as railways or buses, the only internal cost that the users bear is their 
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personal time. Other costs, regardless they are or are not external for the transport operator, 
are not directly paid by the users so they are external costs for the users. However, in 
exchange for the service provided, the user has to pay a user fare to the public transport 
company. Consequently, in order to estimate whether external costs are internalized or not for 
public transport modes, we are going to compare the external cost attributed to the user with 
the fare the users pay. 
Taxes are considered costs for this analysis—the costs of funding the public sector—as long 
as taxes are not discriminatory. For instance, income taxes or added value taxes are not 
discriminatory since they are equitably implemented over all transport modes. However, fuel 
taxes are discriminatory since, at least in Spain and in many other European countries, they 
are applied only to the fuel used by road vehicles, but neither to the fuel nor to any other 
energy source used by railways, planes or vessels. As a consequence of that, we consider that 
discriminatory taxes are a hidden charge applied to road vehicles (car and buses). 
Unlike public transportation users, private car users pay most of the transport operation costs 
they produce: fuel, tolls, depreciation, repairs and so on. In this case, the user of the service 
covers the vehicle cost. Therefore all the investment, maintenance and management costs, 
including the fuel, are internal as they are paid by the user of the service itself. The only costs 
which can be considered external are the costs the users do not pay: pollution, noise, 
congestion, climate change and accidents. In the case of the CAR mode, external costs are 
internalised by paying taxes, specifically fuel taxes. For this reason we compare the external 
cost cars produce with the hidden charges that cars pay because of the existence of 
discriminatory fuel taxes. 
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Figure 1- Methodological approach 
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4. The case study of the Madrid-barcelona corridor 
We apply the method described above for the Madrid-Barcelona corridor case study (shown 
in yellow in Fig. 2). Four ways to compete within this source-destination pair: car, bus, train 
and plane.  
 
 
Figure 2 - HSR Network in Spain. Year 2010 
 
In Spain there are about 22 million cars for a resident population of approximately 49 million 
inhabitants in the year 2009 (INE, 2009). This represents the 71.25% of the total vehicles in 
Spanish roads. 
 
One can therefore say in general terms that there is on average about 1 car every 2 people. 
According to official data, it is possible to estimate that the division between petrol and diesel 
fuel for long-distance traffic is: 30.2% for vehicles with gasoline engine and 69.8% for 
vehicles with diesel engine. Both cities are quite compact, the density of Madrid is of 54,000 
inhabitants / km ² and the density of the city of Barcelona is 15,900 inhabitants / km ². Madrid 
has a population of about 3.3 million inhabitants with about 1,950 thousands private vehicles, 
but the metropolitan area reaches about 6.5 millions inhabitants with about 3,900 thousand 
private vehicles. Barcelona has about 1.6 millions inhabitants with about 480 thousand private 
vehicles, but its metropolitan area reaches about 3 millions inhabitants with about 970 
thousand private vehicles. 
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Bearing in mind that the metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona, together reach about 10 
millions people, which means that there are about 5 millions private vehicles present only in 
the two metropolitan areas, and along the corridor there are important centers of attraction as 
the city of Zaragoza. 
This explains why even though it is well served by other modes of transport (such as PLANE, 
HSR), the corridor undergoes a prevalence of CAR. 
The purpose for which we analyze the AIR mode in this work is because its market share is 
second respect to CAR’s. It is composed mainly of people who work and need to move 
between Madrid and Barcelona taking advantage of the high frequency guaranteed by the 
transport plane Iberia (airline Spanish). 
Iberia has been major carrier in this route especially because of its air shuttle service called 
“Puente Aéreo” (from now on PA).   
The most important rail service available is the high-speed rail (HSR) showed in Figure 2, 
which is 625 km and was opened in 2008. 
In recent years there has been competition between rail and air transport (HSR vs PA).The 
competition is facilitated by several factors, including the liberalization of the aviation 
market: the disappearance of companies "flag" and the entry into the market of other 
companies, including the so-called "low cost", which makes possible a more competitive and 
efficient market. 
The ranges of competition between the two modes are not completely certain, but many 
authors (EC report 318) say they are between 250 and 1200 km away. 
The Madrid-Barcelona corridor before entering the HSR was served by the railway line 
Madrid-Barcelona, a poor service quality, particularly in terms of commercial speed reached 
between these two cities. A conventional train Talgo technology covers a distance of 625 km 
in 5 hours and 30 minutes for an average ticket price of € 65 and a service frequency of 8 
departures a day. Before opening the service HSR "Alta Velocidad Española” (AVE) 
sponsored by the rail service was approximately 800,000 passengers a year. 
For this reason most of the trips between Madrid and Barcelona were carried out by air 
transport. In fact, the Madrid-Barcelona was the busiest air route in Europe before the 
inauguration of the HSR. Iberia has been the main vector in this path mainly because of its air 
service shuttle called PA, which moved 3,000,000 passengers before the opening of the 
service HSR. 
This shuttle was designed as a service for commuters where passengers do not need a 
previous booking. Simply they have to arrive at the airport and get on the next available 
flight. If a flight is full another one is ready to leave shortly during peak hours. The idea was 
to provide a lot of flexibility and short waiting times at the airport. The PA has its own brand 
identity and fee structure. The PA was a kind of second home for generations of businessmen 
and politicians, ready to pay for all this flexibility and convenience. It has been for years the 
most profitable path of Iberia. 
After the liberalization of European airspace, other carriers such as Spanair, Air Europa and 
Vueling entered the market. Although these companies are gaining market share over the 
years, they have never been able to beat the hegemony of Iberia in the path. 
The completion of the HSR between Barcelona and Madrid had a stronger effect on the road 
as it emerged as a real alternative in terms of frequency and comfort for business travelers, 
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taking half of the market on the corridor Madrid-Barcelona. This forced Iberia to reduce 
capacity and frequencies while maintaining small planes. However, the 625 km between 
Madrid and Barcelona are really at the limit of what is considered a competitive distance for 
HSR. For this reason the analysis of competition between HSR and the PA in this corridor is 
particularly interesting. 
Before the entry of the HSR at the end of 2008, the distribution of flights was as follows: Air 
traffic about 160 daily flights between Madrid and Barcelona (Iberia: 90 flights (60 flights 
regular + 30);Spanair: 40 flights; Air Europa: 15 flights; Vueling: 14 flights). 
The strategy followed by the two methods was the opposite. While airplane mode has 
maintained its 30 daily flights in both directions, in spite of all the circumstances, the railways 
have tried to increase theirs: from 17 trains each way offered in February 2008, to 27 offered 
in March 2010. 
Despite the drop in passengers the mode air maintains its frequency even if the high speed is 
gaining market share. Both modes are aware that to maintain or even increase the demand, the 
frequency factor is essential for the customer who needs to make the trip and return on the 
same day. In the strategy of both, it is also very important the travel time. In this sense, in the 
year 2009 the total travel time was approximately 1 hour and 50 minutes for the airplane and 
3 hours for the high speed. By contrast, the total travel time by road is more than 5 hours in 
the case of car and more than 7 in the case of bus. This means that the characteristics of the 
customers are completely different.    
This has led to two key steps: first, to unify the programming of the air, so that passengers on 
scheduled flights are integrated directly into the special service of the airlift. In addition, as 
demand drops, Iberia chooses to change its fleet of aircraft in favour of other smaller models, 
in order to reduce costs and maintain frequencies. 
CAR and BUS uses the A2, N2 and B10 motorways, which has a length of 618 km. 
The analysis of the modal share in the corridor is reported in Table 1.  
 
           Table 1 - Number of users. Year 2009  
Items  CAR BUS RAIL PLANE 
Number of vehicles 9,402,395 36,135 9,855 58,035 
Load factor 1.4 38.3 270.9 52.9 
Number of users (2009) 13,163,354 1,382,886 2,670,407 3,072,879 
% 65% 7% 13% 15% 
             Source: Movilia 2006/2007,INE (2009),RENFE (2009),Alsa (2009), AENA (2009). 
 
The corridor Madrid-Barcelona is one of the busiest in Europe in terms of passenger 
transport. The mode of transport used is the car, with a market share of over 65%, followed by 
the plane with a share of 15% and the HSR with a share of 13%, while the share of bus is only 
7%.  The other two modes of passenger transport, air and rail occupy about 28% of the 
corridor. They compete on factors such as frequency, speed and prices that affect the choices 
of user who needs to move between the two cities. The remaining portion is occupied by the 
modal bus mode. 
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4.1 Calculation of external costs 
The first step has been the computation of the external costs for the different transport modes. 
In this research, we consider the following external costs: congestion, accidents, noise, air 
pollution and climate change. We have calculated the external costs by implementing the 
approach of the “Handbook on the estimation of external costs in the transport sector” 
(Maibach et al., 2008), which was entrusted by the European Commission to the University of 
Delft. We have used the figures of the manual that better fit the characteristics of the 
transportation modes and specificities of the corridors that we analyze.  
 
Regarding the calculation of congestion costs, the handbook mentioned previously provides a 
maximum and a minimum figure for interurban infrastructure. In the end, we have decided to 
utilize the intermediate value. The marginal external costs per user and per trip are shown in 
Table 3.  
 
    Table 3 – Marginal external costs per users per trip (€) 
€ct CAR BUS RAIL PLANE 
CONGESTION 44.14 1.61 0.46 97.46 
ACCIDENTS 163.33 5.97 0.18 2.24 
NOISE 4.41 0.48 5.93 4.33 
CLIMATE CHANGE 197.21 23.82 47.51 5.32 
AIR POLLUTION 255.70 73.88 21.22 1.71 
TOTAL(€ct) 664.79 105.76 75.31 111.07 
TOTAL(€) 6.65 1.06 0.75 1.11 
% TOTAL 69.47 11.05 7.87 11.61 
     Source: analysis of the authors 
 
It can be noted that the CAR produces much greater external costs than the public transport 
modes. The greenest transport mode is the RAIL. The BUS is very efficient in terms of 
external costs because it has a very high occupancy rate. In this corridor, buses carry on 
average 38.3 passengers each. 
4.2 Economic balance 
Piguvian taxes should equal marginal external costs, but they should do so at the optimal 
output level. However, as we do not know the optimal output level, once the externalities 
have been computed, we are going to evaluate whether the CAR, the BUS, the RAIL and the 
PLANE internalize the external costs they cause at the current output level. To that end, we 
calculate the gap between the marginal external costs per user and the average fare or charge 
per user for each transport mode. As we mentioned earlier, discriminatory taxes are 
considered charges paid by the users. For the calculation of marginal costs we did not 
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consider costs, such as infrastructure investments, which remain fixed in the long-run when 
demand increases. 
Economic balance for CAR  
CAR is a private mode. Users of cars are mostly owners of the vehicles they drive; therefore 
all the internal costs related to the CAR usage are borne by them. Consequently, to evaluate 
the internalization of external costs, we have to compare the marginal external costs that they 
do not bear with the charges applicable to them. For this reason, we calculate only external 
costs. To that end, we have evaluated pollutant emissions, noise, accidents and climate 
change. We do not consider wear and tear costs for the CAR because the damage caused by 
cars to the pavement is negligible compared to other vehicles (Small et al. 1989). 
These costs are balanced with the charges the users pay. Car users pay direct tolls since the 
corridor is not free of toll. Discriminatory fuel taxes are the only charge paid by them. In 
Spain, there are two types of fuel taxes: “Impuesto Especial sobre Hidrocarburos (IEH)” and 
“Impuesto sobre Ventas de Minoristas de Determinados Hidrocarburos (IVMDH)”. 
The former is an indirect tax based on the quantity of acquired fuel and it bears upon the 
production, the import and introduction in the Spanish market of given fuels. This tax has a 
direct impact on the final consumer. The latter was introduced by the law 24/2001. This tax is 
also an indirect tax on the quantity of purchased product and it bears upon the retailing of the 
product subject to the IEH. In 2009, these taxes were both subjected to a 16% of value added 
tax (VAT). The percentage of VAT corresponding to the fuel taxes is also a discriminatory 
tax. 
The economic balance for the CAR mode is reported in Table 5.  
 
                           Table 5 – Economic balance for the CAR mode (€ per user per trip) 
EXTERNAL MARGINAL COSTS CHARGES 
Congestion 0.44 IVMDH 2.15 
Accident 1.63 IEH 17.89 
Noise 0.04 VAT 7.54 
Climate change 1.97 
Air pollution 2.56 
  
  
TOTAL 6.65 TOTAL 27.58 
                            Source: analysis of the authors 
 
It is worth noting that, even though the CAR is the most pollutant mode, the charges the CAR 
users pay through discriminatory—but not necessarily with distortionary—fuel taxes 
outweigh by far the external costs they produce. This result looks striking, because claims that 
car users are overcharged in this corridor. The reason for that is that fuel taxes are much 
higher than the external cost produced by them. This conclusion also holds when taking into 
account infrastructure capacity costs since congestion costs, which reflect the capacity 
constraint of the infrastructure, are also included in the computation of the external marginal 
costs. 
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Economic balance for BUS  
The BUS is a public transport mode whose service is provided by a private company through 
a franchise awarded by the government. For the analysis of this mode, we are going to focus 
on the users to whom all the costs, except his time, are external. The company that owns the 
franchise to operate the service in the Madrid-Barcelona corridor is ALSA. The average ticket 
cost for the link under study is €29.78 and the average occupancy of the vehicles is 38.3 out 
of max 52 seats, which is a medium occupancy. For the computation of the management 
costs, we have contrasted the results provided by ALSA with the outcome of the ACOTRAVI 
software (version 1.0.1)1 available at the website of the “Ministerio de Fomento” of Spain. 
The use of this software has enabled us to double check the results. 
Unlike cars, infrastructure wear and tear costs have been introduced for the BUS, since they 
are not negligible (Di Ciommo F. et al., 2008). Discriminatory fuel taxes are paid by the bus 
company to the government. Consequently, the bus company pass this tax on the users 
through the fare charged to them. Fuel taxes are hence incorporated implicitly in the value of 
that fare (*). These taxes are not considered a cost in the balance since they are 
discriminatory. 
 
Table 6 – Economic balance for the BUS mode (€ per user per trip) 
EXTERNAL MARGINAL COSTS PER USER CHARGES 
Amortization 2.12 Fare (*) 29.78 
Drivers’ salary 3.94 *VAT 0.17 
Maintenance 0.85 *IVMDH 0.12 
Tires 0.21 *IEH 0.96 
Vehicle Financing  0.74 
Staff 1.57 
Fiscal costs 0.11 
Insurance 0.89 
Indirect costs 2.65 
Fuel (without discriminatory 
taxes) 1.69 IN
TE
RN
AL
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VAT 0.27 
 
 
 
Wear and tear 0.18   
Congestion 0.02   
Accident 0.06   
Noise 0.01   
Climate change 0.24   EX
TE
RN
AL
 
CO
ST
S 
FO
R 
TH
E 
CO
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PA
NY
 
Air pollution 0.74   
 TOTAL 16.28 TOTAL 29.78 
Source: analysis of the authors 
 
The main result is that the BUS mode internalizes far all external costs produced by it. Also 
fuel taxes are higher than the external costs produced by BUS mode. 
                                                 
1
 www.fomento.es 
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Economic balance for RAIL  
The approach used to assess the economic balance for the RAIL mode is the same as the one 
conducted for the BUS mode. The high speed rail service is provided by Renfe, which is the 
national Spanish rail company. Unlike the BUS mode, the RAIL mode is not subjected to any 
kind of discriminatory tax. 
The external marginal costs have been computed considering the data provided by Renfe 
itself in its 2009 annual report. It is necessary to underline that since Renfe does not own the 
infrastructure for the service, it has to pay a fee to the rail infrastructure company (named 
ADIF). This fee is higher than the wear and tear costs produced by the trains. Approximately 
30% of this charge represents the infrastructure wear and tear costs. The average ticket price 
in 2009 to travel from Madrid to Barcelona was 97.99 €. The RAIL economic balance is 
reported in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 – Economic balance for the RAIL mode (€) 
EXTERNAL MARGINAL COSTS PER USER CHARGES 
Staff costs 7.55 Fare 97.99 
Other materials and services 14.90     
Information System 0.55     
Risk prevention 0.68     
Others 0.27     
Common cooperative center (before 
amortization and interests) 1.38     
Interest and financial charges 1.83     
Common cooperative center (after 
amortization and capital equipment) 3.45     
Amortization  and cost of the 
immobilized capital 0.25     
Change in estimates for repairs 6.32     
Moving expenses 0.17     
Integria2 6.69     
IN
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Energy Traction 4.36     
Wear and tear cost 7.85     
Congestion 0.01     
Accident 0.002     
Noise 0.06     
Climate change 0.48     EX
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RN
AL
 
CO
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S 
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R 
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NY
 
Air pollution 0.21     
  TOTAL 57.01 TOTAL 97.99 
Source: analysis of the authors 
 
                                                 
2
 Rail maintenance and repair, with criteria of efficiency and competitiveness with the foreign 
sector. 
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The subsidies that Renfe receives from the State will not appear in the budget proposal as it 
does not affect in any way the individual user. Moreover, these subsidies only can cover 
services classified as public service, and obviously, the high speed is not between them.  
The analysis was done to explain how this mode of transport works and sustains itself 
economically. Looking at the problem in terms of internalization of costs it is evident that 
external costs are lower than what you pay to use this mode of transport. 
Economic balance for PLANE 
It is important to note that in the ticket price are not accounted for the external costs generated 
by each of the different modes of transport, as this could lead to substantial differences 
between them. The cost of air transport that supports the passenger is represented in the ticket, 
which varies depending on the type of company and Class. The price of the airline ticket taxes 
are accounted for air transport and airport fees charged to the aircraft. 
If we analyze in detail the actions of the total costs of an airline, most of the costs are for fuel, 
whose price is set by the oil market, which usually affects the final price of the ticket. As for 
the other expenses incurred by the airlines, both traditional and "low cost" they relate to the 
promotion costs, maintenance, personnel, administration, and the airport in general. 
The cost of call includes all taxes and services that the airline has to pay, and even if there is 
not a single criterion for classification and counting, it is usually considered to be composed 
mainly of:  
• Tax passenger: they are taxed according to the number of passengers carried and 
include fees for the use of infrastructure and security tax; 
• Aircraft rates: are taxed according to the type of aircraft concerned (this group 
includes the landing fee, the rate of approach and other airport charges); 
• Taxes: Some countries apply taxes as additional measures for the financing of airports, 
to fund supplementary programs of environmental average character, noise insulation 
programs, etc..; 
• Handling (Operations): amounts paid by airlines to agents providing support services 
on the ground. 
It is possible to know with any certainty the first three components of the cost of call 
(passenger tax, aircraft tax and taxes) because their amounts are fixed for a certain period of 
validity. However, it isn’t possible to obtain the same certainty for management fees, since 
the standard price will always be subject to wide margins of variation. 
A proper analysis of the cost of operation is effected by the unitary factor on the cost of each 
passenger per kilometer (€ / PKT). This factor takes into account not only the operational 
costs, the number of passengers carried by each company as well as the distance between the 
origin and the destination. 
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Table 8 –Analysis of transaction costs (€ct/PKT) 
Items of Cost  Iberia Spanair Air Europa Vueling 
Total cost 9.91 6.72 7.54 6.99 
Personnel costs 3.07 0.58 0.68 0.86 
Cost of fuel 1.42 1.12 1.42 0.99 
Cost of use of 
infrastructure 1.78 1.83 3.57 2.62 
     Source: analysis of the authors 
 
Using the values in the table above we are going to calculate the total cost for each airline in € 
/ PKT, shown in Table9: 
 
    Table 9 –Analysis of transaction costs (€) 
Items of Cost Iberia Spanair Air Europa Vueling 
Total cost 127,052,614.92 38,290,999.99 17,185,365.47 13,940,317.18 
     Source: analysis of the authors 
 
This allows us to calculate an average cost of call for the two airports of Madrid and 
Barcelona in Table 10 is equal to: 
 
               Table 10 –Analysis of Average cost of call (€/passenger) 
Total cost 196,469,297.56 € 
Passenger Corridor PA 3,072,878.88 Passenger 
Average cost of call 63.94 €/ Passenger 
                   Source: analysis of the authors 
 
This 64 € / passenger as an index of the average cost of call is very useful because it allows us 
to trace the total cost of the aircraft per trip that is about 8,951 €. In fact for the low-cost 
airline, it was estimated in earlier studies that it was approximately 8,500 €. We may share the 
total cost of the aircraft to the single passenger using the average load factor for the aircraft, to 
obtain the marginal cost per passenger and it will be added to the external costs in Table 11. 
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Table 11 – Economic balance for the PLANE mode (€) 
EXTERNAL MARGINAL COSTS PER USER CHARGES 
Personal Pilot 8.25 Fare 118.05 
Staff on board 8.25     
Maintenance 10.61     
Airport tax 4.72     
Charge of air navigation 4.72     
Service offered to passengers 4.72     
Marketing, promotion and sale 5.89     
Amortization 4.72     
Rental and leasing fleet 11.79     
Parking charges and service of earth 4.72     
Selling General and Administrative 4.72     
IN
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Fuel 38.90     
CONGESTION 0.97     
ACCIDENT 0.02     
NOISE 0.04     
CLIMATE CHANGE 0.05     
EX
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AIR POLLUTION 0.02     
  TOTAL 113.09 TOTAL 118.05 
Source: analysis of the authors 
5. Conclusions and further perspectives 
This work shows that the marginal external costs produced by car, bus and plane are superior 
to those produced by high-speed trains. We can also say that the high-speed rail is the cleanest 
of all surface modes. We note that every transport mode internalizes the external costs it 
produces. However, the case for road transport is largely paid through fuel taxes 
discriminatory. The reason for that lies in the fact that marginal external costs are not higher 
than the fixed transport costs which are charged by to the users. 
In spite of this, this work shows that the competition between plane and rail in the Madrid-
Barcelona corridor is distorted, so allocative efficiency is not achieved. 
The plane barely internalizes the external costs it produces, this is important because the two 
modes high speed rail and plane are in strong competition in the hallway for their market 
share.  
Improving allocative efficiency in favor of the internalization of external costs would justify 
reducing High Speed fares. This will change the market share by increasing the 'high-speed’ 
rail demand. 
The main outcome of this work is that, unlike the general though, road modes seem to 
internalize their external costs in non-congested interurban corridors. Results like this show 
that the European Union should not carry out a charging policy without a comprehensive 
analysis of the effects of discriminatory fuel taxes across different transport modes. 
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Favouring one mode of transport to other imposing taxes, without, however, a thorough 
analysis of the transport system creates imbalances in the market.  
In order to internalize external costs properly (the strategy should be integrated into a broader 
concept of sustainable transport) we suggest the following possibilities: 
• Implementation of a common European fuel tax, applicable to all modes of transport, 
to achieve the objectives of a long-term strategy of the climate in Europe. The types of 
environmental tax for CO2 emissions must be consistent with the proposed shadow 
prices (at least 20 per tonne of CO2 in relation to the Kyoto targets). It is of the utmost 
importance the inclusion of international aviation in the European tax system to reduce 
the distortion caused by the difference in tax treatment between different modes. 
• A greater effort on the part of the railways to accelerate technical progress in 
improving their environmental performance, such as the improvement of the acoustic 
behaviour of trains (see Action Plan against noise UIC), the increase in energy 
efficiency (see Plan ' action diesel UIC), and the use of renewable energy sources. 
• Internalize the external costs of accidents and environmental externalities in the areas 
of road and air transport, as these components are the main causes of most of the 
external costs. 
• Other measures in the field of road transport, in order to increase efficiency, such as 
the intensive use of new technologies in the process of management information 
systems and intermodal systems and most effective lines of responsibility in case of 
accident and / or environmental damage. Driving styles and ecological insurance, 
supported by measures to mitigate traffic and "cool" (including limitations on speed). 
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